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I. INTRODUCTION
Population games [1] , [2] model interactions among a large number of players, or agents, in which each agent's payoff or fitness depends on its own strategy and the distribution of strategies of other agents. There has been extensive research in a variety of settings, ranging from societal [3] to biological [4] to engineered [5] .
A central question in population games, as well as the related topic of learning in games [6] - [8] , is understanding the long run behavior of player strategies. In particular, under what conditions do population strategies converge to a solution concept such as Nash equilibrium? The outcome depends on both the underlying game and the particular evolutionary dynamics (e.g., [9] ), and behaviors can range from convergence for classes of game/dynamics pairings [10] to chaos in seemingly simple settings [11] . Furthermore, a specific game can exhibit inherent obstacles to convergence for broad classes of evolutionary dynamics [12] . Contrary to Nash equilibrium, there are relaxed solution concepts, such as coarse correlated equilibria, that are universally (i.e., for all games) induced by various forms evolutionary dynamics [13] , [14] .
Of specific interest herein is the class of population games called stable games [10] . These games exhibit a property called "self-defeating externalities". Whenever a segment of the population revises its strategies, the payoff gains in the adopted strategy are less than the payoff gains of the abandoned strategy. It was shown that the class of stable games results in convergence to Nash equilibrium when paired with a variety of evolutionary dynamics. Following work [15] established a connection between stable games and passivity theory [16] .
The connection to passivity enables the opportunity to analyze in a similar way broader class of both games and evolutionary dynamics. Of particular interest here are higher order games and higher order dynamics. In the canonical models of population games, the fitness of various population strategies is a static function of the population composition.
In a higher order model, this dependence can be dynamic, e.g., as a model of path dependencies [15] . Likewise, in canonical forms of evolutionary dynamics, the number of states is equal to the number of population strategies. Higher order dynamics, through the introduction of auxiliary states, can exhibit qualitatively different behaviors. For example, instabilities [12] or even chaos [11] can be eliminated through modifications of standard evolutionary dynamics that reflect a form of myopic anticipation [17] , [18] . Recent work has shown that higher order variants [19] of the well know replicator dynamics can lead to the elimination of weakly dominated strategies, followed by the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, a property not exhibited by standard replicator dynamics. This paper considers the following converse question: Under what conditions does a evolutionary dynamic stabilize all stable games? In addressing this question, we will admit both higher order evolutionary dynamics and higher order stable games. Using methods from robust control analysis, we show that if an evolutionary dynamic does not satisfy a passivity property, then it is possible to construct a higher order stable game that results in instability. The results are similar in spirit to prior work on the necessity of a small gain condition to stabilize certain classes of feedback interconnections [20] - [22] .
II. PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATIONS
In this section, some preliminaries and notations form game theory and passivity theory are provided in order to establish our results.
A. Passivity theory
Passivity implies useful properties such as stability, and the importance of passivity as tool in nonlinear control of interconnected systems-unlike Lyapunov stability criteriarelays on the fact that any set of passive sub-systems in parallel or feedback configuration forms a passive system. In other words, by ensuring that every subsystem is passive, a complex structure of subsystems can be built to satisfy certain properties.
Consider Σ to be a nonlinear dynamical system with the following state space realization:
where, u ∈ R m is the system's input vector, y ∈ R m is the system's output vector and x(t) ∈ R n is the system's state vector. Next, we present two definitions for passive system from both state space and input-output perspectives.
Definition 1:
The nonlinear system Σ with state space (1) is said to be passive if there exist storage function L(x(t)) such that:
The input-output definition of passivity property is given as follows:
Definition 2: The nonlinear system Σ is said to be passive if there exist constant α such that:
where, f, g T = T 0 f (t) T g(t)dt. Remark: In the case of equality in the inequalities (2) and (3), the system is said to be lossless.
The stability of the feedback interconnection between passive systems is a fundamental result in passivity theory (e.g., [23] ). That is, the negative feedback interconnection between a passive system Σ 1 and strictly passive Σ 2 , is stable feedback interconnection. Also, the closed loop system from r to y 1 is passive.
The following definition defines the δ-passive and the δanti-passive dynamics. The definition was introduced in [15] , where the connection between passivity property and games were established.
• input strictly δ-passive if there exists a constant α and β > 0 such that
The following proposition derives the relationship between passivity and δ-passivity for linear systems. Consider the linear time invariant (LTI) system with R as an input-output mapping and the following state space representation:
where, A ∈ R n×n , B ∈ R n×m , C ∈ R m×n , and D ∈ R m×m .
Proposition 1:
The input-output mapping R is passive if and only if it is δ-passive.
Remark: The proof is omitted due to the space constraints and can be found in the full version of the paper in [24] .
B. Stable Games
A game G, in general, consist of three basic elements. Number of players N : are the decision makers in the game context. Strategies S: are the set of actions that a particular player will play given a set of conditions and circumstances that will emerge in the game being played. Payoff P : is the reward which a player receives from playing at a particular strategy.
A population game has a set of strategies S = {1, 2, ..., m} and a set of strategy distributions X = {x : Σ i∈S x i = 1}. Since strategies lie in the simplex, admissible changes in strategy are restricted to the tangent space T X = {z ∈ R m :
A state x * ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium if each strategy in the support of x receives the maximum payoff available to the population.
We now recall the definition of stable games for continuously differentiable games as presented in [10] , [15] . First, define F (x) : S −→ R m to be the payoff function that associate each strategy distribution in S with a payoff vector so that F i : S −→ R m is the payoff to strategy i ∈ S. Also, define DF (x) to be the Jacobian matrix of F (x).
∀z ∈ T X. More detailed discussions on stable games and there dynamics are given in [10] , [15] .
The relationship between passivity and stable games is established in [15] . That is, let X denote locally Lipschitz X-valued functions over R + and P denote locally Lipschitz R m -valued functions over R + . Theorem 1 ( [15] ): A continuously differentiable stable game mapping X to P is δ-anti-passive game.
C. Higher-order dynamics and games
In the continuous-time standard evolutionary dynamics and games, the game is static mapping from strategies X to payoffs P , P = F (x), and the dynamics are restricted first order mapping from payoffs P to strategies X,
The dynamical view of this feedback loop can be extend to a mapping of strategy trajectories to payoff trajectories. This viewpoint allows us to introduce generalized forms of dynamics and games, such as higher-order dynamics and games, to generate these trajectories.
Higher-order dynamics can be introduced-independent of the game-through auxiliary states to the the first order dynamics [17] , [18] , which can be interpreted as path dependency. Also, similar higher-dynamics, but depends on the game, can be obtained by the direct derivative of the first order dynamics [19] . It has been shown in [11] , [12] , [17] - [19] that the modification of the standard dynamics can exhibit qualitatively different behaviors. One form of generalized higher-order dynamics obtained by an auxiliary state z is given as follows:
Similarly, static games can be generalized by introducing internal dynamics into the game. This concept is illustrated in [15] through dynamically modified payoff function coupled with the static game. Therefore, we view the higher-order games as a generalization of standard games by introducing internal dynamics into the game, i.e., dynamical system mapping from strategies X to payoffs P .
III. NECESSITY CONDITIONS FOR STABLE INTERCONNECTION WITH PASSIVE SYSTEMS
This section establishes the following necessity condition: If a system Σ 1 is stable in the negative feedback interconnection with all passive systems, then, Σ 1 must be passive. To prove this statement, we recall a necessity result for a small gain condition [25] . We first consider linear systems followed with a linearization based result of nonlinear systems.
A. Small Gain Theorem
The following proposition provides the necessity conditions for feedback interconnected systems with small gain property. The result is part of the small gain theorem provided in [25] . In other words, Proposition 2 can be read as follows: if a system Σ 1 is stable in the feedback interconnection with all small gain systems, then Σ 1 must have small gain property.
Following Proposition 2, we recall the relationship between passivity and small gain property (e.g., [23] ), in order to provide similar result for passive systems.
The passivity-small gain relationship is known as follows: (5) Now, we are ready to provide the necessity part for linear passive systems.
Theorem 2: For any LTI stable strictly non-passive system G(s), there exists strictly passive system R(s) such that the closed loop feedback between [G(s), R(s)] is unstable.
Higher-order Learning Rule
Higher-order Game P X X + P Fig. 1 : Feedback interconection of higher-order dynamic and generlaized game, where P is the payoffs and X is the strategies.
Remark: The statement of Theorem 2 is equivalent to the following statement: Suppose that G is LTI stable system and forms stable feedback interconnection with all passive systems, then G must be passive.
IV. PASSIVITY ANALYSIS FOR HIGHER-ORDER DYNAMICS AND GAMES
In this section, we focus on passivity analysis of the higher-order evolutionary dynamics and games. As shown in Fig. 1 , games and evolutionary dynamics can be illustrated as a feedback interconnection. We will show that if an evolutionary dynamic or a learning rule is non-δ-passive, then it is possible to construct higher-order δ-anti-passive game that results in instability. In other words, a learning rule results in stability for all higher-order δ-anti-passive games if and only if the learning rule is δ-passive.
The following theorem provides necessity conditions for passive feedback interconnections of Higher-order learning rule and higher-order game as an analogy to Theorem 2.
Theorem 3: If the linearization of the Higher-order learning rule is not δ-passive, then there exist δ-anti-passive game that results in unstable positive feedback interconnection.
A. Second order Logit dynamics
Roughly speaking, the logit learning rule can be considered as a noisy version of the best response dynamics. In this dynamic, the change in the strategies of the players depend on the level of their knowledge about the game and the strategies currently played [26] .
The second order logit dynamics can be obtained by introducing an auxiliary state in the payoff function as follows:ẋ
where, x is the state vector, p is the payoff and p is the introduced auxiliary state. The equilibrium conditions are p = p and x i = σ max ( p i ).
First, we show that the linearization of (6) is non-passive system. Hence, according to our results, it is possible to construct higher-order passive game that results in instability with the second order Logit dynamics. The linearized system is given as follows:
where, δx = x − x * is the deviation from equilibrium, A x =
, m is the number of pure strategies and B p = I. The linearized logit dynamics (7) is a linear second order dynamical system and its transfer function has relative degree equal two, i.e., the linearized logit dynamics is not passive. Before we analyze the linearized logit dynamics (7) and construct a higher-order game that results in unstable feedback interconnection, we will reduce the linearized dynamics using the transformation δx = δx * + N δw, δp = δp * + N δq and p = N ξ, where δx * , p * is the equilibrium point, N is the null space of a vector of ones and satisfies N T N = I. This projection ensure that the dynamics stays in the simplex. The reduced linear dynamical system is given as follows:
Now, consider the case where i = 1, 2, 3 and let δW = δw ξ . The reduced dynamical system (8) is given as follows:
which is non-passive dynamical system G(s) with the following transfer function matrix:
The construction mechanism provided in this paper will be employed to construct a passive system (game) that result in unstable feedback loop with the second order logit dynamics. The internal dynamics of the constructed passive game is given as follows:ż
where, The internal dynamics of the game (11) is passive mapping from u g to y g . The feedback interconnection between the game and the logit dynamic implies that u g = δw and y g = δq. Using Proposition 1, it follows that the above game is δ-passive from δẇ to δq. This implies that there is a storage function L(z, q) such that:
Also, the transformations X = X * + N δw and P = P * + N δq, implies thatẊ TṖ = δẇN T N δq = δẇδq. Using (12), it follows that the game (11) is δ-passive fromẊ toṖ . Hence, the higher-order δ-passive game from strategies X to payoff P is given as follows:
Proposition 1 implies that the dynamics (9) is not δ-passive. Also, using the fact thatẊ TṖ = δẇδq, it follows that the dynamics (9) is not δ-passive fromẊ toṖ . Hence, according to Theorem 3, the feedback interconnection between the constructed δ-anti-passive and the non-δ-passive dynamics result in instability. Figs. 2 and 3 shows the evolution of the states of the feedback interconnection between the constructed game, which is δ-anti-passive, and the second order non-δ-passive logit dynamics (6) .
B. Replicator dynamics
Replicator dynamics are important class of evolutionary dynamics, which emerges originally from system biology and nature evolution [27] . It provides way to represent selection among a population of diverse types.
First, we show that first order replicator dynamics are indeed passive dynamics. In particular, replicator dynamics belongs to special class of passive systems known as lossless systems.
The replicator dynamics is given as follows:
where p i is the payoff for using strategy i. Let x * to be a Nash equilibrium for the dynamic. Define e xi = x i − x * i to be the deviation from the equilibrium. The .
following theorem shows that first order replicator dynamics from the payoff p i to the error e xi belongs to a special class of passive systems named lossless systems. Theorem 4: Replicator dynamic mapping from p i to e xi is passive lossless.
It is known that replicator dynamics can exhibit different behaviors, that is stable, null stable and unstable depending on the game, (e.g., [10] ). For example one can show that rock paper scissors game with replicator dynamics can generate these three different behaviors. These behaviors can be seen as a consequences of the lossless property of the replicator dynamics.
One can show that the linearization of the first order replicator dynamic results in a single integrator. Now, we will show that the second order replicators are non-passive dynamics, as the linearization result in double integrator (double poles at the origin). Hence, according to our result in this paper, it is possible to construct higher-order game that result in instability with the second order replicator dynamics.
The second order replicator dynamics can be obtained by introducing auxiliary state p in the payoff function. This results in the following dynamics:
The equilibrium conditions are p * i = 0, x * i = σ max ( p * i ), and p * i = 1 . The linearization of the replicator dynamics (15) is given as follows:
x * is any point in the simplex. The reduced system can be obtained using the transformation δx = δx * + N δw, δp = δp * + N δq and δ p = N ξ as follows: 
The system (16) is a double integrator, which is not passive. Accordingly, one can construct higher-order passive game that results in instability with the second order replicator dynamics. For instance, the higher-order game can be constructed as follows:
Similarly, as in logit dynamics in the previous section, one can show that the above game δ-anti-passive from strategies X to payoff P . Figs. 4 and 5 shows the evolution of the states of the positive feedback interconnection between the constructed game, which is δ-anti-passive, and second order non-δpassive replicator dynamic (15) . 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, passivity analysis for higher order dynamics and games has been presented. The necessary conditions for evolutionary dynamics to exhibit stable behaviors for all higher-order passive games is provided. Methods from robust control analysis are used to show that if an evolutionary dynamic does not satisfy the passivity property, then it is possible to construct a higher-order passive game that results in unstable feedback loop. The results is employed to construct a higher-order passive games for two different dynamics to illustrate the feedback passivity concept in games.
Similar investigation for first order dynamics was conducted in [28] . They considered similar question raised in this paper, but for class of standard learning dynamics from passivity perspective. Implications of stability for various passive dynamics both analytically and by means of numerical simulations was discussed.
